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Abstract ‘‘Fair and equitable benefit-sharing’’ is one of the objectives of the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In essence, benefit-sharing holds that
countries, farmers, and indigenous communities that grant access to their plant
genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge should share in the benefits that
users derive from these resources. But what exactly is understood by ‘‘fair’’ and
‘‘equitable’’ in this context? Neither term is defined in the international treaties. A
complicating factor, furthermore, is that different motivations and perspectives exist
with respect to the notion of benefit-sharing itself. This paper looks at six different
approaches to benefit-sharing that can be extracted from the current debates on
‘‘Access and Benefit-Sharing.’’ These approaches form the basis of a philosophical
reflection in which the different connotations of ‘‘fair and equitable’’ are considered,
by analyzing the main principles of justice involved. Finally, the various principles
are brought together in order to draw some conclusions as to how a fair and
equitable benefit-sharing mechanism might best be realized. This results in several
recommendations for policymakers.
Keywords Access and benefit-sharing  Commutative justice 
Distributive justice  Plant genetic resources  Traditional knowledge
Introduction
Since 1992, 191 signatories to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have
committed themselves to ‘‘the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out
of the utilization of genetic resources’’ (UNEP 1992, Article 1). This figures as one
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of three objectives of the Convention, along with the conservation and the
sustainable use of biological diversity. Put briefly, the benefit-sharing objective
holds that countries (and communities) granting access to their genetic resources
(and traditional knowledge) should receive a share of the benefits that users derive
from these resources. But what is to be understood by fair and equitable in relation
to benefit-sharing, however, is unclear. Neither term is defined in the Convention,
and, given the continuing negotiations on an International Regime of Access and
Benefit-Sharing, many will indeed agree that there remain ‘‘widely divergent views
on what constitutes fair and equitable benefit sharing and how best to promote it’’
(Artuso 2002, p. 1355).1
The United Nations Environmental Program admits that ‘‘whether the sharing of
benefits is ‘fair and equitable’ is a question that (…) depends on the value system
upon which the judgment is based’’ (UNEP 1998, p. 9). However, as Bystro¨m and
colleagues argue, it should be possible to reach consensus on certain criteria and
conditions necessary for establishing a fair and equitable benefit-sharing relation-
ship, for otherwise ‘‘it is difficult to envisage how the CBD provisions in this respect
could ever be meaningfully implemented’’ (Bystro¨m et al. 1999, p. 26). Following
their attempt to launch a list of such criteria and conditions, a number of studies
have analyzed the standards of ‘‘fair and equitable’’ in different case studies and
Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) agreements (Mulligan 1999). Most conclude,
however, that much is still to be done, for example because fair and equitable
benefit-sharing ‘‘too often constitute merely pious rhetoric and remain unrealized in
the field’’ (Laird 2002, p. 418); or because when an ABS agreement is made, it is
possible that ‘‘significant inequities in knowledge and power between indigenous
peoples and companies’’ will result in definitions of fair and equitable benefit-
sharing ‘‘that are predominantly shaped by the latter.’’ (Vermeylen 2007, p. 423)
This article aims to contribute to this ongoing project by linking the concept of
benefit-sharing to different principles of justice, initiating a philosophical discussion
on the meaning of fair and equitable benefit-sharing. To facilitate such discussion,
the present work will not focus on a particular ABS agreement or case study, but
instead build upon the different approaches to benefit-sharing, as identified by De
Jonge and Louwaars (2009). Providing an overview of the assumptions, perspec-
tives, and arguments employed in the current debates on plant genetic resources,
that study identifies six distinct approaches to benefit sharing, each with its own
central motivation and objective (and preferred mechanism(s) by which to realize
that objective). Employment of this overview facilitates an analysis of the different
conceptualizations of ‘‘fair and equitable’’ at play in the contemporary arena of
benefit-sharing negotiations with respect to plant genetic resources and related
traditional knowledge.2
The six approaches to benefit-sharing distinguished are characterized by their
central motivation, thus:
1 For a brief, official outline of the Convention and subsequent negotiations, see the introduction at the
CBD website, at: http://www.cbd.int/abs/regime.shtml (Accessed 8 May 2009).
2 The conceptualizations of fair and equitable benefit-sharing will differ when, for example, human
genetic resources or traditional artifacts are concerned.
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• The South-North imbalance in resource allocation and exploitation
• Biopiracy and the imbalance in intellectual property rights
• Protecting the cultural identity of traditional communities
• A shared interest in food security
• The need to conserve biodiversity
• An imbalance between intellectual property protection and the public interest
These approaches form the basis of a philosophical reflection and will be
discussed in parallel with different principles of justice in the following sections.
The aim is to provide more insight into the meaning of ‘‘fair and equitable benefit-
sharing’’ and, ultimately, to draw some conclusions on how a fair and equitable
benefit-sharing mechanism could best be realized.
Commutative Justice and the Characteristics of Plant Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge
A first approach to benefit-sharing is based on the imbalance in the allocation and
exploitation of plant genetic resources between developed and developing countries.
Our world is rich in biodiversity, and although threatened, this diversity remains the
basis of human life and something from which, clearly, we all benefit. Still, some
parts of the world are by nature richer in these resources than others; also,
historically, some parts have benefited more from these resources than others. The
current situation is that many developing countries are rich in biodiversity, while
many developed countries are considered biodiversity-poor (Faith 1996; Vavilov
1951). The rise of biotechnology has only reinforced the practical implications of
this asymmetry, especially as it is the gene-poor industrialized countries that most
have the capacity to invest in the biotech industry and benefit from the new ways of
exploiting the world’s biological resources. This resulting imbalance is an important
motivation for benefit-sharing. Indeed, it is the basic rationale behind the ABS
model in the CBD.
Before the CBD, plant genetic resources were generally considered a ‘‘common
heritage of mankind’’ (De Jonge and Korthals 2006, p. 146–147), a common good
that is freely accessible to all. Responding to the growing resistance in especially
poor but gene-rich developing countries against the uncompensated use of the
genetic diversity found on their territories, the CBD declares that states have
sovereign rights over their plant genetic resources and introduces the first access and
benefit-sharing model in the world. This model can best be described as a
compensation mechanism, requiring that developing countries be compensated for
the contribution of their biological resources. Fair and equitable benefit-sharing,
then, comes down to fair compensation, where ‘‘each party gives one thing and
receives another, with a focus on the equivalence of the exchange’’ (Schroeder
2007, p. 207). In philosophical terms, this can best be summarized by the
Aristotelian principle of commutative justice or justice in exchange (Ritchie 1894).
So, commutative justice refers to fair compensation and focuses on the
equivalence of a transaction between two parties. In the context of ABS, the
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parties involved in the exchange, or transaction, are the providers and the users3 of
plant genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge (TK). It is, however, not
always clear who the legitimate users and providers of these resources are, because
the resources have non-rival and non-excludable characteristics. Non-rival means
that the use and consumption (of the resource) by one person does not prevent others
from enjoying the same resource or good; and non-excludable indicates that it is
difficult or simply impossible to exclude others from consuming the resource in
question.
Commutative justice is relatively easy to realize when a resource is rivalrous and
excludable in nature. Food products or a barrel of crude oil, for example, go from
one hand to another, and an equitable arrangements for their exchange need not be
overly complex. A plant, and even the minuscule combination of biochemicals that
make up its genes, have a similar character. But every gene is at the same time a
‘‘basic unit of heredity,’’ which by directing the production of RNA, determines the
‘‘synthesis of proteins that make up living matter and are the catalysts of all cellular
processes.’’ (Kleinedler 2005) Genes are carriers of information that is continuously
reproduced and is, obviously, the locus of value of plant genetic resources (Parry
2005). But information is a non-rival resource and plants are non-excludable,
insofar as they normally grow and multiply in vast quantities across regions,
countries and even continents. It is rather hard, therefore, to envisage how the
genetic information contained in any specimen (or part thereof) of a particular plant
species could become subject to a fair and equitable exchange between two parties.
The CBD aims to solve this problem by ‘‘Recognizing the sovereign rights of
States over their natural resources’’ (UNEP 1992, Article 15.1), and refers to the
‘‘country of origin of genetic resources’’ (Article 2) in order to more specifically
define the so-called ‘‘user and provider countries’’ involved. As several studies have
shown, however, the country of origin of a particular genetic resource is very
difficult to determine (Petit et al. 2001), and the ability to exercise national control
over the movement of genetic resources virtually impossible (Safrin 2004). But how
should a just exchange of the valuable, but primarily intangible properties of genetic
resources (and traditional knowledge) then be organized? The most suitable
mechanism for this seems through the application of Intellectual Property Rights
(IPRs), since such rights aim to protect and control the exchange of ‘‘items of
information or knowledge’’ (WIPO 2005, p. 3).
IPRs are designed to protect a variety of intangible assets, such as literary and
artistic works, scientific discoveries, and industrial design, or, more generally
‘‘inventions in all fields of human endeavour’’ (WIPO 1967). In their natural form,
plant genetic resources, of course, are not human inventions and consequently
cannot be protected by IPRs. In many countries, however, it is possible for an
individual, company or other institution to apply for such rights upon developing a
new plant variety,4 or even when just a single gene or genetic sequence has been
isolated and its function specified (Drahos and Blakeney 2001). The state of affairs
3 I.e. the exploiters of the resources in question, not the end-users of the products that may result from
that exploitation.
4 See, e.g., http://www.upov.int/index_en.html (Accessed 8 May 2009).
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is thus that (developing) countries in which the genetic resources occur naturally
cannot protect these resources with IPRs, but the inventions based on those genetic
resources can be so protected—which occurs especially in (developed) countries
with a liberal IPR system and strong biotechnology industry.
This discrepancy is the central concern in a second approach to benefit-sharing,
which focuses on the imbalance in IPRs and subsequent acts of ‘‘biopiracy.’’ The
term ‘‘biopiracy’’ was coined by the North American Action Group on Erosion,
Technology and Concentration (ETC Group) to refer to the ‘‘appropriation of the
knowledge and genetic resources of farming and indigenous communities by
individuals or institutions who seek exclusive monopoly control (patents or
intellectual property) over these resources and knowledge.’’5 In addition to the fact
that IPRs cannot be employed to protect natural plant genetic resources, most
indigenous groups and farming communities are generally unable to apply such
rights to their traditional knowledge and technologies. Even though these are human
inventions, the traditional lifestyle and production methods of communities are
typically ineligible for IP protection.
Patents, for example, protect inventions that satisfy criteria such as novelty,
inventive step, and industrial applicability. These criteria are specifically designed
for a competitive, industrial context. Traditional knowledge is developed in a
cultural context, and tends not to meet the criteria of novelty and inventive step in
that it is often ‘‘communicated and applied openly’’ (Koopman 2005, p. 527). In
addition, the collective character of most traditional knowledge prevents it from
being easily attributed to an individual IP holder (Roht-Arriaza 1997). Thus, IPRs
do not seem to support a fair and equitable exchange model of plant genetic
resources and related (traditional) knowledge. On the contrary, as is clear from the
above definition of biopiracy, some may regard IPRs as a primary vehicle for
unfairness and inequity.
So what does all this say about the possibilities for realizing fair and equitable
benefit-sharing on the basis of commutative justice? The answer to this question is
not very promising. Plant genetic resources are a valuable resource for many
developing countries but, because of their non-rival and non-excludable character-
istics, cannot be appropriated and traded in the same way as can other natural
resources, such as oil or minerals. To secure a fair share of the benefits that derive
from the use of these resources abroad, a provider country must either protect all its
plant genetic resources (and genetic information) from crossing its borders, or it
needs to track and negotiate a share of the benefits of all usages of its resources in all
countries of the world—and this only provided that it can prove that it is the country
of origin of these resources. Farmers and indigenous communities encounter similar
problems when attempting to protect and control their traditional knowledge (from
regional and national as well as international interests), and they are likely to have
even less means to prevail. Conclusion: it is practically impossible for providing
5 At: http://www.etcgroup.org/en/issues/biopiracy.html (Accessed 8 May 2009). This definition of bi-
opiracy is widely referred to in the literature, yet, it is also highly contested. See, e.g., Hamilton (2006)
and Laird and Wynberg (2008).
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countries and communities to secure a fair exchange of the plant genetic resources
found within their territory, or the traditional knowledge present in their culture.
But any transaction involves two parties, so if a just exchange of these resources is
indeed to be realized then it follows that the users (and user countries) need also to be
an active party in the arrangements. Unfortunately, so-called ‘‘user-side measures’’
have mostly been neglected in the international negotiations and country legislations
on ABS. The predominant idea is that provider countries should put their ABS
legislation in place and users act in accord with this while collecting resources in
those countries. But as the foregoing has shown, this strategy does not really suit the
resources in question. Furthermore, the lack of user-measures has resulted in a
situation in which ‘‘users who do not know or disclose the source country of the
resources they are using are not required to engage in any benefit sharing or substitute
activity’’ (Tvedt and Young 2007, p. 130). This loophole has rendered the current
system of access and benefit-sharing very ineffective and, obviously, unfair.
One of the few proposals that aims to counter this loophole is that of a
‘‘disclosure measure,’’ to be included in patent applications worldwide (Tobin et al.
2008). This would require applicants for patents to disclose information regarding
the origin, source, or legal provenance of the genetic resources and/or traditional
knowledge utilized within the patent application (Barber et al. 2003). This would
establish a legal liability for compliance with ABS conditions on the user side. It is,
however, uncertain whether such an initiative would really make a difference to the
problem at hand. There is first an issue of coverage, as the proposal does not pertain
to all non-patented resource applications—but the main question, again, is how it
would be practically possible to track the origin or even source of, for example,
every parent line used in a new tomato variety that has built upon centuries of cross-
breeding. Or how patent officers could verify such information.
This disclosure measure does, however, have one advantage, which may suit the
link between plant genetic/traditional knowledge resources and benefit-sharing much
better. We have already seen that the specific characteristics of these resources make
a benefit-sharing model based on their physical exchange very difficult: user-oriented
measures such as the disclosure of origin indicate that benefit-sharing responsibilities
could also be invoked by the utilization of such resources (and benefits arising there
from), rather than merely by their specific exchange. But if benefit-sharing is not tied
to a transaction between two parties, then how can we decide to whom the benefits
should go and what a fair and equitable distribution would be? Questions of how a
fair division of a certain good can be realized amongst a group of recipients belong to
the domain of distributive justice. This domain has a much broader usage and
tradition in philosophy than commutative justice and different theories of distributive
justice present different guidelines as to how such division should look and who the
legitimate recipients would be.
The Principle of Entitlement and Issues of Procedural and Cognitive Justice
Distributive justice is primarily concerned with how to ‘‘render to each his due’’
(Miller 1976, p. 21). The main question is, of course, how to decide what a person’s
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(group’s or country’s) ‘‘due’’ exactly is. The principle of entitlement holds that
someone’s due is that to which one has a right or is entitled to. The aforementioned
sovereign rights and intellectual property rights over plant genetic resources and
related knowledge can thus be considered entitlements that may guide the fair and
equitable allocation of benefits. We have already seen, however, that these rights are
extremely problematic in this respect: since the resources in question have non-rival
and non-excludable characteristics they are not easily defensible as items of
property (Thompson et al. 1994), which means that it is far from obvious that it is
possible to clearly specify the subsequent entitlements on which a fair distribution
of benefits could be based. Furthermore, according to the ETC. Group, intellectual
property rights can easily be a vehicle for biopiracy instead of fair and equitable
benefit-sharing.
Still, there are many who argue that such entitlements need to be established
because without reference to private (or community) ownership and intellectual
property, the resources in question should be considered public goods for which no
compensation or benefit-sharing can be demanded (Hamilton 2006). One may be
hopeful that philosophy can help in this respect, for example by deciding on how
and when resources become ownable. Indeed, many philosophers have shed light on
and done battle over the ontological status of property, and lately, several studies
have focused on this topic in relation to the new biotechnologies and genetic
resources (Go´rski 2005; John 2000). However, I am inclined to agree with
Thompson’s conclusion that ‘‘the philosophical case for recognizing intellectual
property rights in genes, sequences and genetic processes is mixed, and that no
thoroughly decisive arguments can be brought to bear either way.’’ (Thompson
2007, p. 253)
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the concept of biopiracy does presuppose that
intellectual property rights exist and that the problem of biopiracy does not lie with
these rights as such, but with their current organization. Take for example the
aforementioned criteria for patent protection. According to these criteria one cannot
legally apply patents either to plant genetic resources in their natural state, or to any
knowledge, invention, or product already established before the new patent
application is made. The problem is that the traditional knowledge and other
inventions (e.g., plant varieties) of many communities are not documented and
therefore not known to the patent office examiners checking for any ‘‘prior art’’
relevant to new applications—so a patent can easily be granted to an invention that
free-rides upon such knowledge and resources. A subsequent problem is that
traditional communities rarely have the means to go through the complex and costly
procedures to challenge that patent in court (Hamilton 2006). Here then, the problem
lies not with IPRs per se, but with the ‘‘failure of international patent systems to
recognize the contributions (e.g., the prior ownership) of indigenous farmers’’ and the
‘‘disparity between the access of the rich and the poor to legal services.’’ (Thompson
2007, p. 256)
This conclusion points to another principle of justice, namely procedural justice.
More commonly referred to in jurisprudence than in philosophy, this principle aims
especially at the accuracy of legal processes and the participatory rights of those
involved; these must be satisfied in order for a procedure to be considered fair
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(Solum 2004). Even though procedural justice is not concerned with the allocation
of benefits (i.e., distributive justice), it is equally important in the context of fair and
equitable benefit-sharing, as it focuses on the fairness of the processes through
which this is realized. Fair procedures within the international IPR system are
necessary to realize a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism, which will
otherwise continue to be seriously undermined so long as the system favors the
powerful (e.g., biotech companies) rather than the weak (e.g., indigenous
communities) (van den Belt 2003).
Procedural justice is also especially important since ABS negotiations at both the
international and local level involve such diverse stakeholders as national
governments, international NGOs, traditional communities, and multinational
corporations. These stakeholders have access to widely diverging levels of financial
and legal resources, and thus, power. These differences, and particularly the special
needs of developing countries and traditional communities—but also of minority
and/or underprivileged groups (e.g., women) within countries and communities—in
this regard, have to be taken into account if fair and equitable benefit-sharing
agreements and regimes are to be realized (Albin 2001; Alvarez-Castillo and
Feinholz 2006). It is for this reason that the CBD has established some initiatives
and funds to support traditional communities.6 Their active involvement in national
and international negotiations remains an issue of concern, however, for which there
are many reasons, including such basic problems as a lack of resources (money,
personnel, etc.) with which to participate in negotiations, language barriers, and a
lack of established (lobbying) links with state representatives, the primary decision
makers. In fact, the fundamental issue at stake here can better be described in
relation to a third approach to benefit-sharing, which is essentially concerned with
the cultural identity of traditional communities in a globalizing world.
The cultural differences between traditional communities and other parties in the
ABS negotiations are substantial. Many indigenous communities have fundamen-
tally different worldviews and conceptions of benefits, sharing, and property from
our ‘‘Western’’ ones. The notion of genes, for example, understood as isolated and
tradable commodities, derives from a modern technical development and does not
exist in that manner in many traditional cultures. The rapid expansion of
modernization threatens many of these cultures and the ABS framework is itself,
of course, a form of globalization. Therefore, in order to make sure that ABS
regulations do not constitute an extra pressure on traditional communities, forcing
them to adopt foreign standards and demands, one has to take their ideas about how
benefit-sharing should be organized seriously into account. This may take the form
of including the customary laws of such communities in ABS agreements (Tobin
2004), or it might imply that their right to be left alone is respected if they do not
want to be involved in such agreements.
The importance of taking into consideration differences in culture and even
worldviews during ABS negotiations may more aptly be described with reference to
the principle of cognitive justice. This principle is particularly referred to in the field
of science democratization (Leach and Scoones 2006; van der Velden 2009).
6 See, e.g., http://www.cbd.int/traditional/general.shtml (Accessed 8 May 2009).
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Recognizing the plurality of knowledge systems, it aims to secure the equal
treatment and representation of different ways of comprehending the world. As
such, cognitive justice goes beyond the focus on fair processes and equal
participation in procedural justice, underscoring the ‘‘constitutional right of
different systems of knowledge to exist as part of dialogue and debate’’
(Visvanathan 2005, p. 92). In the context of ABS, this means that the different
cultures and conceptions of things like plants and benefits need to be equally
represented in a dialogue in which one does not dominate another.
In line with this, it must be acknowledged that many traditional communities find
the link between benefit-sharing, IPRs, and the subsequent commodification of
resources particularly problematic. Whereas land tenure, private property, and
capitalism are central notions in Western culture, many indigenous communities
consider that land and related resources can belong to no human being. Or as they
state, ‘‘patenting and commodification of life is against our fundamental values and
beliefs regarding the sacredness of life and life processes and the reciprocal
relationship which we maintain with all creation.’’ (Tauli-Corpuz 2004) Returning
to the concept of biopiracy, Hamilton observes indeed that ‘‘what is problematic for
many contesting biopiracy is not necessary who owns it, or who will benefit, but that
the debate is framed in these terms to begin with.’’ (Hamilton 2006, p. 173) Access
and benefit-sharing agreements are, therefore, considered by many indigenous
peoples’ organizations to ‘‘simply coerce Indigenous peoples into participation in
the economic exploitation of their knowledge and resources’’ (IPCB 2004), and
those entering into such agreement are advised to ‘‘carefully evaluate the political,
social, and cultural costs’’ (Reihana 2006, p. 11).
It is not only these cultural differences that need to be taken into account. On a
socio-political level the marginalized position of many traditional communities and
minorities may warrant further measures. When analyzing the statements of
different indigenous peoples’ councils and organizations, one soon learns that the
CBD is just another forum where these groups (have to) fight for their basic human
rights (UN PFII 2007). One such statement proclaims, for example, that ‘‘without
recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights to control access to both their genetic
resources and Indigenous knowledge, no benefit sharing process will be fair and
equitable’’ (GRAIN 2007). The statement refers to the lack of land rights and self-
determination of traditional communities in many countries, which gives a
completely different dimension to their demands for benefit-sharing.7
So, traditional communities are likely to have not only a different understanding
of some of the central notions underlying ABS, but also an agenda that goes beyond
that of many of the other stakeholders involved. These differences, together with the
imbalances in negotiation capacity, have to be respected and observed if fair and
equitable benefit-sharing arrangements with such groups are to be established. Here,
the principle of entitlement, with its obvious link to intellectual property rights,
7 In light of this, it may even be necessary to reassess the current division in the CBD between plant
genetic resources that fall under the sovereign rights of States and traditional knowledge that belongs
(subject to national legislation) to local communities.
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seems not to be the best standard by which to guide the allocation of benefits. And it
is in this context that the principle of desert can be of use.
Principles of Desert, Need, and Equity
According to the principle of desert, a person’s due is not based on one’s entitlements
but on what one deserves in light of one’s actions. There are different desert-based
principles regarding what should count as the basis for deserving (Lamont 1994;
Miller 1976), but in the context of ABS one’s contribution to the conservation and/or
development of a certain plant or product seems most relevant. Employed thus, the
principle of desert can enable the sharing of benefits in proportion to the
contributions of specified groups or individuals without making reference to
intellectual property rights. Furthermore, the Bonn Guidelines8 refer explicitly to this
principle of desert in stating that ‘‘benefits should be shared fairly and equitably with
all those who have been identified as having contributed to the resource management,
scientific and/or commercial process’’ (UNEP 2002, Article 48).
One issue related to this principle is that of how to classify or quantify different
contributions. Obviously, it is very difficult to decide upon the relative contribution
of different parties involved in the creation of a new drug or crop variety: what, for
example, is the contribution of an indigenous community in the Amazon that for
centuries has nurtured a medicinal plant in relation to that of a company that has
invested millions of dollars in a commercial cleansing gel of which one ingredient is
derived from that plant?
The current transaction model of ABS in the CBD seems to imply that some sort
of price tag can be attached to plant genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and
the contributions of those that nurture and develop them. Many consider this
approach problematic for several reasons, for example because there is no historical
context or precedent, a market system for these resources has never existed in the
past (Falcon and Fowler 2002). On the contrary, the values of plant genetic
resources and related contributions are matters of deep dispute: where some negate
the value of wild plants and landraces for the biotechnology industry and
commercial breeding (Wolfe and Zycher 2005), others speak of the ‘‘green gold’’
and ‘‘untold billions of dollars’’ that these industries have already earned from such
resources (Kloppenburg 2004; Sharma 2005). There is, however, another treaty that
refers to fair and equitable benefit-sharing in relation to the principle of desert but
without building upon a market-based transaction model.
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGR) of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that fair and
equitable benefit-sharing is ‘‘fundamental to the realization of Farmers’ Rights’’
(FAO 2001, Preamble). These rights are based on the ‘‘enormous contribution that
the local and indigenous communities and farmers of all regions of the world (…)
8 The Bonn Guidelines are a non-binding document adopted by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD
in 2002 with the aim of assisting parties in organizing and developing ABS agreements and policy-
making.
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have made and will continue to make for the conservation and development of plant
genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture production
throughout the world’’ (Article 9.1). The ABS mechanism of the ITPGR introduces
a Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing that establishes a list of major
crops and forages that are freely accessible to farmers, breeders, and researchers of
member countries (Part IV).
The Multilateral ABS System of the ITPGR is germane to a fourth approach to
benefit-sharing, one that is primarily concerned with our shared interest in food
security. Based on the understanding that no country or even continent is self-
sufficient in its plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, this approach
prioritizes a benefit-sharing model that facilitates access and exchange of genetic
resources essential to food production across the world. The ITPGR states, indeed,
that the facilitated access to these resources ‘‘constitutes itself a major benefit of the
Multilateral System’’ (FAO 2001, Article 13.1). Furthermore, it goes onto state that
the benefits accruing from this system, be they in the form of information,
technology or money, ‘‘should flow primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers in
all countries, especially in developing countries, and countries with economies in
transition, who conserve and sustainably utilize plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture’’ (Article 13.3).
This contribution of farmers in developing countries and around the world is
central to benefit-sharing in the ITPGR. In this general form, however, it does not
(and cannot) serve as a concrete allocation principle. While recognizing the
contributions of farmers, the sharing of benefits that arise from the multilateral
system is aimed at supporting the main objectives of the treaty, namely food
security and sustainable agriculture.9 Indeed, a first group of conservation projects is
now being supported from the treaty’s benefit-sharing fund.10 The ITPGR
distribution of benefits seems, therefore, to be guided by another principle of
justice, namely the principle of need.
Holding that goods should be distributed in accordance to people’s needs, the
principle of need is again subject to different interpretations of its basic concept—
what should be considered as ‘‘needs.’’ Happily, however, this is not overly
problematic in this case as most interpretations agree at least on the inclusion of the
basic material necessities for human life, like food, shelter, and medical care. Indeed,
we might refer here to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948). These
‘‘ideal rights’’ are directed towards providing a minimum standard of decent living,
and should not, therefore, be confused with ‘‘entitlements’’ (Feinberg 1970, p. 255).
Obviously, the ITPGR is particularly concerned about the fundamental need for food
security, to which fair and equitable benefit-sharing is linked in its principal objective
(along with sustainable agriculture—Article 1.1). Furthermore, with the repeated
references to developing countries and countries with economies in transition, to
which the benefits of the multilateral system should primarily flow, the treaty
9 See Appendix F of the ITPGR on the priorities of its Funding Strategy. At: ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/
planttreaty/funding/fundings1_en.pdf (Accessed 8 May 2009).
10 http://www.planttreaty.org/funding_en.htm (Accessed 8 July 2009).
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acknowledges the special needs of these countries and their farmers in respect of this
objective.
A similar connection between benefit-sharing and the principle of need can be
found in the CBD. The CBD Preamble, for example, states that ‘‘conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity is of critical importance for meeting the food,
health and other needs of the growing world population, for which purpose access to
and sharing of both genetic resources and technologies are essential’’ (UNEP 1992).
The need to preserve our biodiversity—as reflected in the first two of the three listed
objectives—is central to the whole CBD and constitutes a fifth approach towards
benefit-sharing. Although the first two objectives are not explicitly linked to fair
and equitable benefit-sharing, the third objective, it is generally considered that the
prospect of benefit-sharing constitutes an important incentive for developing
countries to protect their potentially valuable plant genetic resources, and that
benefit-sharing operates as an instrument that assists these countries in gaining
access to the means for conservation by promoting the flow of technology,
information, and financial resources. So even though benefit-sharing in the CBD is
set up as a model of commutative justice, it employs the distributive justice notion
of need: both in relation to the universal requirement to conserve biodiversity in
order to meet fundamental needs of humankind, and with respect to the special
needs of developing countries and traditional communities in so doing.
The principle of need thus has an important role in both the ITPGR and CBD.
Yet, the multiple references to the special needs of developing countries point also
to another principle of distributive justice, namely the principle of equity. The
principle of equity aims to inform and/or modify general rules such as the
distributive justice principles discussed, in order to take account of morally relevant
differences in particular situations. It seeks to provide ethical decisions in such
situations by holding that ‘‘equals should be treated equally, and unequals
unequally’’ (Barry 1965, p. 152). The relevance of this principle to our inquiry
into fair and equitable benefit-sharing is manifest: poor countries and communities
deserve extra support in order to satisfy their fundamental needs, protect their
resources and entitlements in the international IPRs system, and also raise their
negotiation capacities. The principle holds that due to the existing inequalities, extra
efforts have to be undertaken if a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism is to
be realized.
A Tension Between Principles?
There seems, however, to be a tension between the principles of need and equity
introduced here and those of commutative justice and entitlement discussed earlier,
along with the recently considered principle of desert. Even though the latter two
(entitlement and desert) do not involve a specific exchange between two parties (as
commutation does), the sharing of benefits according to all these three principles is
directed to those that have specific claims based upon certain rights they hold and/or
particular contributions they have made. In essence, parties receive compensation.
The principles of need and equity, however, do not work like this. They focus
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instead on the distribution of benefits to those who need them most. So the question
is which of these two directions or purposes of benefit-sharing is most important?
At first sight, the idea of compensation seems crucial to the whole ABS debate.
Indeed, developing countries and communities strongly resist the free and
uncompensated use of their biological resources, which were originally considered
the common heritage of mankind (De Jonge and Korthals 2006). This resistance was
a major driving force for the incorporation of benefit-sharing in the CBD in the first
place, and it continues to be the main motivation behind accusations of biopiracy
and the call for (binding) benefit-sharing provisions in international and national
legislation. So, the idea of compensation is very important in the context of benefit-
sharing, but can the same be said about the focus to distribute benefits to those in
need?
Yes it can. The main reason for this is that one can argue that a benefit-sharing
model that aims to compensate or reward parties for their contributions would not be
needed in a just and fair world, or even in the affluent countries of today. With
respect to health care, for example, Schroeder argues that in many Western societies
a ‘‘viable and essentially fair exchange model is already in existence between the
health care industry and human research subjects’’ (Schroeder and Lase´n-Dı´az 2006,
p. 140). DNA donors with a particular disease can expect to receive direct benefits
from research and development based on (their) DNA in the form of (potentially)
therapeutic treatments and medicines that are generally quite accessible through the
health care (insurance) systems in their countries. Furthermore, indirect benefits can
be expected through jobs and wealth generated by the industries involved. In this
case, an extra benefit-sharing mechanism to reward donors for their contributions is
unnecessary.11 The main issue is that in an ideal world, it ‘‘does not matter’’ who
provides the blood or traditional knowledge that lead to new inventions ‘‘as long as
we all have access to the benefits of their use’’ (Schroeder and Pogge 2009).
For many people in this world, however, this ideal situation is non-existent. On
the contrary, some two billion people lack access to essential medicine (Hollis and
Pogge 2008), millions die from preventable diseases every year (WHO 2008). The
figures are similar with respect to food and agriculture: in 2007 the number of
chronically hungry and undernourished people rose to 923 million (FAO 2008, p. 9),
and most farmers in developing countries (i.e., most farmers in the world) lack
access to improved seeds and other agricultural inputs. A large proportion of people
in the world simply do not have access to the products and benefits of modern
research. Not even to those goods that can save their lives. It is against this
background that the demands for benefit-sharing become obvious and, indeed,
justified (Schroeder and Pogge 2009). The principles of need and equity are not just
relevant to the concept of benefit-sharing—they are elemental.
A sixth, and final approach to benefit-sharing relates to this aspect of human
poverty, focusing on the imbalance between intellectual property protection and the
public interest. We have already seen that IPRs provide exclusive rights to the
creators of such intangible assets as knowledge, inventions, and scientific
discoveries. In biotechnology, IPRs play an important role and many consider
11 This may, of course, be different if excessive profits are made from the donor contributions.
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them a major trigger for research and development in the field (Oldham and Cutter
2006). So far, however, this research and development has hardly benefited the poor
because it is primarily aimed at commercial markets where IP can generate revenues
(FAO 2004; Global Forum for Health Research 2004). Furthermore, the growing
numbers of IPRs may block access to new biotechnology tools and products as it
becomes too expensive for private organizations and state institutions in developing
countries to pay the multiple royalties and purchase the necessary licenses to make
use of them (Atkinson et al. 2003). In this context, a fair and equitable benefit-
sharing mechanism is not concerned with compensating parties for their rights held
or contributions made, but aims primarily to stimulate a more equitable distribution
of the benefits of modern research and development.
Towards a Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing Mechanism
So, what does all this tell us about the central question, how a fair and equitable
benefit-sharing mechanism can best be realized? One of the main outcomes is that
fair and equitable benefit-sharing is not merely about the mechanics of an ethical
distribution (or exchange) of benefits. Before anything else, we need to consider two
important prerequisites that have to be satisfied if a fair and equitable benefit-
sharing mechanism is even to have a chance of being properly developed and
sustained.
One relates to the socio-political power differences between the different
stakeholders in ABS negotiations at both national and international levels. For this
reason, the principle of procedural justice, with its emphasis on fair and accurate
processes and equal participation, certainly needs to be emphasized. This means,
amongst other things, that investments in the negotiation capacities, knowledge
base, and provision of access to legal services of developing countries and
traditional communities especially is and will be a long term necessity. It is
important to realize that ABS is not an issue for national governments and
international organizations alone, but includes the involvement of many non-state
actors at all levels, from the local to the international. Careful analysis of the
complex relationships between these stakeholders, and especially between national
governments and traditional communities (e.g., regarding their respective rights
over specific resources), is required in order to facilitate a fair process and equitable
outcome of negotiations.
Closely related to this issue are the substantive, cultural differences, and
worldviews involved. Most important here is to realize that stakeholders may have
radically different conceptualizations of the world (cosmos) and completely
different understandings (if any at all) of such central notions as genetic resources,
property, and sharing. The principle of cognitive justice aims to emphasize the equal
status of these different conceptions as a starting point for debate and genuine
dialogue. This would, for example, imply that the link between benefit-sharing and
intellectual property rights is weakened or, at least, not taken for granted. If a party
to a particular ABS agreement is uncomfortable with the application of intellectual
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property rights to their resources or the products derived from them, this should be
respected and other forms of product protection considered.
Moving beyond these two preconditions, we can make the generalization that,
despite the evident diversity of approaches to the concept, benefit-sharing aims to
realize some form of compensation and of equity. These two ideas were found to be
fundamental to benefit-sharing. Together with the more specific objectives of
biodiversity conservation and food security, this give us some indications as to how
a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism might best be organized.
The main conclusion to be drawn is that the current exchange model of ABS in
the CBD, and subsequent focus on commercial transactions and contracting in ABS
policies, is not the best way forward. There are several reasons for this. One is that
the resources in question often do not fit a two-party exchange model. Of course, in
some cases a specific provider and user can be discerned, who can then mutually
negotiate the desired ABS contract. But such situations are exceptional. Because of
the non-rival and/or non-excludable characteristics of plants and related (traditional
or genetic) information, it is practically impossible for providing countries and
communities to control their movement and, therefore, to secure their fair exchange.
This situation is particularly problematic because, up until now, the responsibility
for benefit-sharing has largely been left to the national governments and local
communities of developing countries. But many of these have very little capacity
(and many other priorities) to put ABS policies in place, let alone to track the
movement of all their biological resources and traditional knowledge. Furthermore,
many of these resources have long since left their territories and can, for example,
be found in botanical gardens, genebanks, and libraries around the world. This state
of affairs, where the resources in question are extremely difficult to monitor, already
widely dispersed, and user measures are almost non-existent, has created many
loopholes in the current system of ABS. Indeed, if a user-party is not actually
collecting its resources in a provider-country (under a Material Transfer
Agreement), then it is soon unclear what benefit-sharing obligations, and to whom,
are required, which simply means that no benefit-sharing will take place.
Another problem with the current transaction model of the CBD is that most
attention (and expectation) is and has been paid to commercial contracts as the
primary way to put the ABS policies in practice. Here, the problem is not only that
there has never existed a market for plant genetic resources and traditional
knowledge, but also, and more pressingly perhaps, that commercial mechanisms
leave very little room to incorporate broader, social goals, such as securing human
needs and equity. Furthermore, food security and conservation goals also are not
easily captured in contracts between two parties. Added to the fact that the focus on
commercial contracts is oblivious to the alternative worldviews of many traditional
communities, we have to conclude that the current ABS model of the CBD is in
need of fundamental revision.
How then should (or can) a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism be
organized? An alternative model, briefly mentioned above, might focus on the
utilization of resources as the trigger for benefit-sharing rather than their specific
exchange. Tvedt and Young (2007) have made a detailed study of the central
requirements for an ABS system that would build primarily on the utilization-
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trigger. Three important steps towards such a system that can be extracted from this
study are the followinmg: First, the development of clear and effective legislation in
the user countries, which involves various disincentives for non-compliance and
incentives for compliance. Second, the definition of exact conditions for benefit-
sharing, such as a clear start and end point for benefit-sharing obligations, and
‘‘internationalized mechanisms’’ that regulate the collection and distribution of
‘‘orphan shares’’ if the source country or country of origin is unknown or
undisclosed. And third, the development of clear standards for the valuation of
resources and benefit-sharing in order to provide a concrete basis for the whole
system and prevent unrealistic expectations and uncertainties for both providers and
users.
Obviously, such a model faces many practical challenges, but in emphasizing the
responsibilities for benefit-sharing at the user side it starts with an important
advantage. If users and user countries are serious about benefit-sharing and commit
themselves to the corresponding objectives in the CBD and ITPGR, they have to
work towards the realization of those objectives. In fact, the principle of equity
holds that the strongest parties have the biggest responsibilities in this regard. This
implies, for example, that ‘‘if the experiential data on ABS to date indicates that it
has not been financially beneficial to developing countries, the Contracting Parties
have an obligation to make it beneficial, rather than to drop it as an unpromising
concept’’ (Tvedt and Young 2007, p. 94). So, in contrast to the current situation, we
have to conclude that the well-to-do countries, companies, and research organiza-
tions must take their responsibility and make the system work.
Other advantages of an utilization model vis-a`-vis the current ABS system of the
CBD are that it does not focus on the movement of plant genetic resources,12 and
that it demands the sharing of benefits irrespective of whether a specific ABS
contract is attached to them. Tvedt and Young hold that determining whether ‘‘the
user took an action that is considered to be the ‘utilization of the genetic resources’
[is] a question that can be answered objectively and documented by evidence’’
(Tvedt and Young 2007, p. 59). This will only be possible if the Contracting Parties
to the CBD manage to clearly define exactly which activities do and do not
constitute a utilization of genetic resources. If realized, this would mean that a clear
entry point for when the ABS system applies can be defined. Together with the
proposed user measures, this could cut out many of the current loopholes in the
system and secure that benefit-sharing does actually take place.
The establishment of the requisite legislation is obviously an important step
towards fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Although it does not in itself say
anything about what a ‘‘fair and equitable’’ benefit-sharing arrangement is or should
look like, if one takes into account that many developing countries and communities
are frustrated with the historic and continuing use of ‘‘their’’ plant genetic resources
12 Unfortunately, Tvedt and Young (2007) focus primarily on plant genetic resources and do not discuss
the same model in relation to the utilization of traditional knowledge. This topic will need extra research
and attention because an utilization model for traditional knowledge needs to take into account the right
of the knowledge holders to prior informed consent, which means that they need to be consulted before
their resources are actually utilized.
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and traditional knowledge without receiving anything in return, then one can
imagine that the guaranteed implementation of benefit-sharing provisions is more
than just a good move in the right direction. It is, in fact, a necessary precondition
for fair and equitable benefit-sharing and crucial first step towards its realization.
A second step then is to establish clear standards for the valuation of resources
and contributions and, thus, benefit-sharing. As argued, this valuation should not be
based on commercial criteria alone, but needs to be informed by the broader
objectives of benefit-sharing. First, it would be necessary for the international
community to agree on some minimum standards for benefit-sharing, so as to
provide a concrete basis for the whole system and facilitate the collection of the so-
called orphan shares into an international fund. At the same time, however, the
challenge is to leave enough room for the multiple objectives and perspectives as
reflected in the diversity of approaches to benefit-sharing. What could be developed,
therefore, is a ‘‘menu of ABS options,’’ which would lay out, next to the minimum
standards of benefit-sharing, several forms of sharing information, technology, and
capacity.13
Ultimately, one has to decide how, and to whom, the benefits should be
distributed in a fair and equitable way. This article has discussed the main allocation
criteria that can be employed in this respect. It has been shown that entitlements can
set clear standards for distribution, but with respect to plant genetic resources and
traditional knowledge it is often unclear who their legitimate right holders are. If the
(group of) right holder(s) to a particular resource is well-defined, then the user and
provider parties can mutually negotiate the benefit-sharing terms and process
(taking into account, of course, the standards set by the international community on,
for example, issues of procedural and cognitive justice, compliance, and the
minimum standards for benefit-sharing). And where resource right holders are not
well-defined, a multilateral approach should be followed in which the benefits are
distributed according to a combination of the other principles discussed—one could,
for example, set allocation criteria that aim to compensate regions or groups of
people (countries, communities) in accordance to their (historical) contributions to
the conservation of biodiversity and food security, and with special attention
to those with particular needs in this respect. In this way, benefit-sharing answers to
the strong demands for compensation without being undermined by an ineffective
exchange model, and at the same time its application is strongly informed by the
principles of equity and need, which are elemental to the concept.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that ‘‘fair’’ and ‘‘equitable’’ benefit-sharing is not defined in the
international treaties in which it appears, discussion of the relevant principles of
13 Both the CBD and ITPGR already pay a lot of attention to such non-monetary benefit-sharing options.
The ITPGR, furthermore, includes provisions for an international fund and a standardized Material
Transfer Agreement with specific benefit-sharing percentages. The utilization model can connect to and
draw from these initiatives.
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justice in this article has resulted in some rather specific recommendations on how
such mechanism can best be realized. One major conclusion is that the current,
bilateral exchange model in the CBD is in need of a major overhaul. It should be
replaced by a system that has more room and ability to support the broader
objectives of benefit-sharing, and less loopholes that undermine the benefit-sharing
provisions in the first place. Several allocation and procedural principles have been
discussed that can inform a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism, and the
utilization model seems a promising framework upon which to build in this respect.
Ultimately, the international community has to come to an agreement on the exact
terms and provisions of a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism, and
considerable investments (and compromises) from all parties will be needed to
move forward successfully from the current stalemate that the international
community has found itself in. Crucially, the developed countries and parties have
to realize that they have the biggest responsibility to make the system work.
Acknowledgments I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this paper for
their helpful comments.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-
commercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Albin, C. (2001). Justice and fairness in international negotiation. Cambridge: University Press.
Alvarez-Castillo, F., & Feinholz, D. (2006). Women in developing countries and benefit sharing.
Developing World Bioethics, 6(3), 113–121.
Artuso, A. (2002). Bioprospecting, benefit sharing, and biotechnological capacity building. World
Development, 30(8), 1355–1368.
Atkinson, R. C., Beachy, R. N., Conway, G., Cordova, F. A., Fox, M. A., Holbrook, K. A., et al. (2003).
Public sector collaboration for agricultural IP management. Science, 301, 174–175.
Barber, C. F., Johnston, S., & Tobin, B. (2003). User measures: Options for developing measures in user
countries to implement the access and benefit-sharing provisions of the convention on biological
diversity (2nd ed.). Tokyo: United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies.
Barry, B. (1965). Political argument. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Bystro¨m, M., Einarsson, P., & Nycander, G. A. (1999). Fair and equitable: Sharing the benefits from use
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. Uppsala, Tagstalund and Bjorkeryd: Swedish
Scientific Council on Biological Diversity.
De Jonge, B., & Korthals, M. (2006). Vicissitudes of benefit sharing of crop genetic resources:
Downstream and upstream. Developing world bioethics, 6(3), 144–157.
De Jonge, B., & Louwaars, N. P. (2009). The diversity of principles underlying the concept of benefit-
sharing. In E. C. Kamau & G. Winter (Eds.), Genetic resources, traditional knowledge and the law:
Solutions for access and benefit sharing. London: Earthscan.
Drahos, P., & Blakeney, M. (Eds.). (2001). IP in biodiversity and agriculture: Regulating the biosphere.
London: Sweet and Maxwell.
Faith, D. P. (1996). Phylogenetic pattern and the quantification of organismal biodiversity. In D. L.
Hawksworth (Ed.), Biodiversity measurement and estimation (pp. 45–59). London: The Royal
Society.
Falcon, W. P., & Fowler, C. (2002). Carving up the commons—emergence of a new international regime
for germplasm development and transfer. Food Policy, 27(3), 197–222.
144 B. De Jonge
123
FAO. (2001). International treaty on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. Rome: Food and
Agriculture Organization.
FAO. (2004). The state of food and agriculture 2003–2004: Agricultural biotechnology, meeting the
needs of the poor?. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
FAO. (2008). the state of food insecurity in the world 2008: High food prices and food security—threats
and opportunities. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
Feinberg, J. (1970). The nature and value of rights. Journal of Value Enquiry, 4, 243–257.
Global Forum for Health Research. (2004). 10/90 report on health research 2003–2004. Geneva: Global
Forum for Health Research.
Go´rski, A. (2005). The ethics of intellectual property rights in biomedicine and biotechnology: An
introduction. Science and Engineering Ethics, 11(1), 4–6.
GRAIN. (2007). UNPFII 6: Indigenous peoples’ rights to genetic resources.
Hamilton, C. (2006). Biodiversity, biopiracy and benefits: what allegations of biopiracy tell us about
intellectual property. Developing world bioethics, 6(3), 158–173.
Hollis, A., Pogge, T. (2008). The health impact fund: Making new medicines accessible for all. Incentives
for Global Health.
IPCB. (2004). Collective statement of indigenous peoples on the protection of indigenous knowledge
agenda item 4(e): Culture. Indigenous People’s Council on Biocolonialism.
John, M. M. (2000). Rights to life? On nature, property and biotechnology. Journal of Political
Philosophy, 8(2), 154–175.
Kleinedler, S. (Ed.) (2005). The American heritage science dictionary: Houghton Mifflin.
Kloppenburg, J. R. (2004). First the seed: the political economy of plant biotechnology, 1492–2000.
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Koopman, J. (2005). Reconciliation of proprietary interests in genetic and knowledge resources: Hurry
cautiously. Journal of Ecological Economics, 53(4), 523–541.
Laird, S. A. (2002). Biodiversity and traditional knowledge: Equitable partnerships in practice. London:
Earthscan.
Laird, S., & Wynberg, R. (2008). Access and benefit-sharing in practice: Trends in partnerships across
sectors. Montreal: CBD Technical Series. 140 pp.
Lamont, J. (1994). The concept of desert in distributive justice. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174),
45–64.
Leach, M., & Scoones, I. (2006). The slow race. London: DEMOS.
Miller, D. (1976). Social justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mulligan, S. P. (1999). For whose benefits? Limits to sharing in the bioprospecting ‘regime’.
Environmental Politics, 8(4), 35–65.
Oldham, P. D., & Cutter, A. M. (2006). Mapping global status and trends in patent activity for biological
and genetic material. Genomics Society and Policy, 2(2), 62–91.
Parry, B. (2005). From the corporeal to the informational: Exploring the scope of benefit sharing
agreements and their applicability to sequence databases. In Bioethics in a small world (pp. 73–91).
Petit, M., Fowler, C., Collins, W., Correa, C., & Thornstro¨m, C.-G. (2001). Why governments can’t make
policy: The case of plant genetic resources in the international arena. Lima, Peru: CIP.
Reihana, T. (2006). The convention on biological diversity’s international regime on access and benefit
sharing: Background and considerations for indigenous peoples. Nixon: Indigenous Peoples
Council on Biocolonialism.
Ritchie, D. G. (1894). Aristotle’s subdivisions of ‘particular justice’. The Classical Review, 8(5), 185–192.
Roht-Arriaza, N. (1997). Of seeds and shamans: The appropriation of the scientific and technical
knowledge of indigenous and local communities. In B. Ziff & P. V. Rao (Eds.), Borrowed power.
Essays on cultural appropriation (pp. 255–290). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Safrin, S. (2004). Hyper ownership in a time of biotechnological promise: The international conflict to
control the building blocks of life. The American journal of international law, 98(4), 641–685.
Schroeder, D. (2007). Benefit sharing: It’s time for a definition. Journal of Medical Ethics, 33(4),
205–209.
Schroeder, D., & Lase´n-Dı´az, C. (2006). Sharing the benefits of genetic resources: From biodiversity to
human genetics. Developing World Bioethics, 6(3), 135–143.
Schroeder, D., & Pogge, T. (2009). Justice and the convention on biological diversity. Ethics and
International Affairs, 23, 265–278.
Sharma, D. (2005). Selling biodiversity: Benefit sharing is a dead concept. In B. Burrows (Ed.), The
catch: Perspectives in benefit sharing. Edmonds: The Edmonds Institute.
What is Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing? 145
123
Solum, L. B. (2004). Procedural justice. Southern California Law Review, 78.
Tauli-Corpuz, V. (2004). Biodiversity, traditional knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples. Penang,
Malaysia: Third World Network.
Thompson, P. B. (2007). Food biotechnology in ethical perspective (2nd ed.). Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Springer.
Thompson, P. B., Matthews, R. J., & van Ravenswaay, E. O. (1994). Ethics, public policy, and
agriculture. New York: Macmillan.
Tobin, B. (2004). Customary law as the basis for prior informed consent of local and indigenous
communities. International Expert Workshop on ABS, Oct 2004, Mexico.
Tobin, B., Burton, G., & Fernandez-Ugalde, J. C. (2008). The search for a practical, Feasible and cost
effective system for certifying compliance with PIC and MAT. Yokohama: UNU-IAS.
Tvedt, M. W., & Young, T. (2007). Beyond access: Exploring implementation of the fair and equitable
sharing commitment in the CBD. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
UN. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights. United Nations.
UN PFII. (2007). International expert group meeting on the convention on biological diversity’s
international regime on access and benefit-sharing and indigenous peoples’ human rights 17–19
January 2007. New York, UN: Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
UNEP. (1992). Convention on biological diversity. Rio de Janeiro: United Nations Environment Program.
UNEP. (1998). COP 4 Inf. 7—synthesis of case-studies on benefit sharing. Bratislava: United Nations
Environment Program.
UNEP. (2002). Bonn guidelines on access to genetic resources and fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of their utilization. The Hague: United Nations Environment Program.
van den Belt, H. (2003). Enclosing the genetic commons: Biopatenting on a global scale. In D. Mieth &
C. Baumgartner (Eds.), Patente am leben? Ethische, rechtliche und politische aspekte der
biopatentierung (pp. 229–243). Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag.
van der Velden, M. (2009). Design for a common world: On ethical agency and cognitive justice. Ethics
and Information Technology, 11(1), 37–47.
Vavilov, N. I. (1951). The origin, variation, immunity and breeding of cultivated plants, translated from
the Russian by K. Starr Chester. In chronica botanica (Vol. 13, pp. 1–366). New York: The Ronald
Press.
Vermeylen, S. (2007). Contextualizing ‘Fair’ and ‘Equitable’: The San’s reflections on the Hoodia
benefit-sharing agreement. Local Environment, 12, 423–436.
Visvanathan, S. (2005). Knowledge, justice and democracy. In M. Leach & I. Scoones (Eds.), Science
and citizens: Globalization and the challenge of engagement. London: Zed Books.
WHO. (2008). Immunization work: 2006–2007 highlights. Geneva: World Health Organization.
Wolfe, T. A., & Zycher, B. (2005). Biotechnological and pharmaceutical research and development
investment under a patent-based access and benefit sharing regime. San Fransisco: Pacific Research
Institute.
WIPO. (1967). Convention: Establishing the world intellectual property organization. Stockholm: World
Intellectual Property Organization.
WIPO. (2005). Understanding industrial property. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.
146 B. De Jonge
123
